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1. Introduction 
   
Public policies or interventions are implemented with the expectation of improving the situation 
of the individuals affected by them, but the extent to which they do so can only be assessed by 
undertaking an adequate policy evaluation exercise. 
Consider the example of publicly-provided training programmes offered to unemployed 
individuals, aiming  at updating and increasing the participants’ skills and hopefully contributing 
significantly to their probability of finding a job. Measuring the effect of these programmes on 
an individual’s future employability may seem, at a first glance, a simple exercise, but in fact it is 
not a trivial task. Should the outcomes of the participants be compared to their pre-programme 
situations? Or instead, should the outcomes of the participants be compared with those of the 
non-participants? What if none of these alternatives are correct? What is the best approach to 
measure the effect of the programme on the outcomes of participants? This report aims to present 
the policy evaluation framework, to explain why the two approaches just proposed are usually 
wrong and to describe four counterfactual evaluation methods currently used to measure policy 
effects. 
The need to quantitatively identify the effects of a policy is nowadays indisputable, as it allows 
the measurement of its real effects and a comparison with the expected ones. Furthermore, the 
policy evaluation exercise gives essential and irreplaceable evidence for future policies in the 
same area. As such, it is an important ex-ante policy impact assessment tool, provided that past 
interventions and contextual situations are similar to the ones under consideration. As a result, in 
the recent decades the policy evaluation literature has gained increasing importance and new 
methodologies have been developed to identify the causal policy effects. 
The aim of policy evaluation is to measure the causal effect of a policy on outcomes of interest, 
on which it is expected to have an impact. The policy’s causal effect is defined as the difference 
between the outcome of the units affected by the policy (the actual situation) and the outcome 
that these same units would experience had the policy not been implemented. The fundamental 
evaluation problem is that we cannot observe simultaneously the same unit in the two scenarios, 
i.e. the scenario in which the policy is not implemented – the counterfactual – is an elusive one to 
produce or simulate. 
What is needed is an adequate control group that is as similar as possible to the affected one, so 
that the policy effect can be identified by the comparison between the outcomes of these two 
groups. Finding such a control group is not an easy task. An analyst may be tempted by one of 
the two following naïve approaches: i) comparing the outcome of interest of the affected units 
before and after the intervention; and ii) comparing units affected by the intervention with those 
not affected. However, neither approach will identify the policy causal effect. In the former case, 
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the outcome of interest might have been affected by factors, other than the policy, which 
changed over time. Therefore it is possible that the policy had an effect on the outcome even if 
the outcome did not change or, on the contrary, that the effect was null even if the outcome did 
change over time. The latter approach is also in general not suitable because affected and 
unaffected units are typically different even in the absence of the policy. This is particularly the 
case when the policy is targeted towards a specific population or when the units can select 
themselves into participation. 
The counterfactual analysis methodologies aim at identifying an adequate control group and, as a 
consequence, the counterfactual outcome and the policy effect. These methods became the 
standard approach to identify the causal policy effects in most institutions and international 
organizations in the last decades, with the World Bank playing a leading role1. However, the 
European Commission uses the counterfactual analysis somewhat parsimoniously in its 
evaluation and ex-ante policy impact assessment guidelines, which still rely on simple impact 
indicators (Martini, 2008) and on baseline scenarios that, in most cases, are not defined 
according to the counterfactual framework. 
In this report we describe the policy evaluation framework and the different counterfactual 
analysis evaluation strategies: propensity score matching, regression discontinuity design, 
difference-in-differences and instrumental variables. For each method we present the main 
assumptions it relies on and the data requirements. These methodologies apply to any type of 
policy and, in general, to any type of intervention (for instance, a programme or treatment2). A 
selection of papers applying each approach in the context of labour market interventions is also 
included3. 
The rest of the report is organised as follows. In the next section we introduce the basic concepts 
of any policy evaluation framework. Section 3 presents the conditions for assessing the causal 
effect of policy interventions and the balancing methods available. Sections 4 to 8 describe each 
of the methods. Finally, section 9 concludes. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
1 See for instance: Khandker, S.R., Koolwal, G.B., & Samad, H.A. (2010). Handbook on impact evaluation. 
Quantitative methods and practices. Washington D.C.  
More generally, in Europe the interest toward the techniques to evaluate the effect of public policies is quite recent 
and often liked to specific policies (e.g. it is quite emblematic the case of the Hartz reforms implemented in 
Germany between 2002 and 2005).  
2
 The counterfactual approach was first developed to estimate the effect of medical and pharmaceutical treatments 
on specific target groups. Thus, most of the terminology related to this methodologies, as for instance the terms 
“treatment”, “treated” and “control group”, come from the medical field. 
3
 Unless otherwise specified, the abstracts of the papers presented have been taken from Scopus 
(http://www.scopus.com/home.url). 
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2. Basic concepts 
 
2.1 Policy intervention 
A policy is an intervention targeted to a specific population with the purpose of inducing a 
change in a defined state and/or behaviour. This definition highlights the three constitutive 
elements of a policy intervention: 
a) A target population: a well-defined set of units (e.g. persons, households, firms, 
geographic areas) upon which the intervention will operate at a particular time;  
b) An intervention: an action, or a set of actions  (≡ treatment), whose effect on the outcome 
the analyst wishes to assess relative to non-intervention. For sake of simplicity, this 
report considers only interventions that consist of a single treatment that can be 
represented by a binary variable (treatment vs. non-treatment or participation vs. non-
participation). Members of the population that are exposed to the intervention are labelled 
as participants (≡ treated), while those who do not take part in the programme are labelled 
as non-participants (≡ non-treated); 
c) An outcome variable: an observable and measurable characteristic of the units of the 
population on which the intervention may have an effect (≡ impact). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.2 Causality 
Impact evaluation is essentially the study of cause-and-effect relationships. It aims to answer the 
key question: “Does participation in the programme affect the outcome variable?” In other 
words, to what extent can the variation observed in the outcome be attributed to the intervention, 
given that all other things are held constant? The answer to this question is obtained by 
subtracting the value of the outcome after exposure to the intervention from the value it would 
Example. The Active Labour Market Programs (ALMP) include three broad classes of 
interventions – training programs, subsidised employment programs, and job search 
assistance programs – that are used in many countries to help labour market participants to 
find and retain better jobs. The primary goal of an ALMP evaluation is to provide objective, 
scientifically-based evidence on the post-program impact of the programme. In most cases, 
an evaluation attempts to measure the extent to which participation raised employment 
and/or earning of participants at some point after the completion of the programme (Card et 
al., 2011). 
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have had in absence of the treatment (≡ net difference). In this context, causality refers to the net 
gain or loss observed in the outcome of the treated units that can be attributed to the intervention. 
 
2.3 Randomised experiments vs. quasi-experiments 
The most valid way to establish the effects of an intervention is a randomised field experiment, 
often called the “gold standard” research design for policy evaluation. With this design the units 
in the target population are randomly assigned to the control and to the intervention groups so 
that each unit has the same probability to be in either of these treatment statuses; outcomes are 
then observed for both groups, with differences being attributed to the intervention.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Example. In 2007, the French Labour Ministry organised a randomised experiment aiming to 
evaluate the delegation to private providers of placement services for young graduates that had 
spent at least six months in unemployment. Following the previous discussion, the target 
population of this intervention consists of young graduates that had spent at least six months 
in unemployment, the treatment is the exposition to private providers of placement services 
and the non-treatment is the French historical public placement agency (ANPE). 
This experiment was realised on a large scale from August 2007 to June 2009 and involved 
10.000 young graduates and 235 local public unemployment agencies scattered into 10 
administrative regions. One of the main innovations of the study rested on a two-level 
randomisation. The first randomisation was at the area level. In a first stage, before the 
experiment started, each one of the 235 local employment agencies was randomly assigned 
the proportion P of jobseekers that were going to be assigned to treatment: either 0%, 25%, 
50%, 75% or 100%. The second randomisation was within each treated area: eligible 
unemployed graduates were randomly selected, given the specified fraction (except of course 
for 100% areas, where everybody was assigned to treatment). Jobseekers assigned to 
treatment were offered the opportunity to be followed and guided by a caseworker in a private 
placement operator. For those who were assigned to the control group, nothing changed: they 
were still followed by the ANPE. The main results can be summarised as follows: the 
programme had indeed a strong impact on the employment situation of young job-seekers 8 
months after the treatment (see Crépon et al., 2011). 
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A major obstacle to randomised experiments is that they are usually costly, time-consuming and 
(especially in Europe) considered to be non-ethical. Concerning this last point, randomisation is 
often seen as arbitrarily and capriciously depriving control groups from the possibility to be 
exposed to a treatment that in principle should bring some benefit. When the randomisation 
design is not feasible, there are alternative designs that an evaluator can choose. These 
approaches, called quasi-experimental or observational studies, compare target units receiving 
the intervention with a control group of selected, non-randomly assigned targets or potential 
targets that do not receive the intervention. If the latter resemble the intervention group on 
relevant characteristics, or can be adjusted to resemble it, then the programme effects can be 
assessed with a reasonable degree of confidence (Rossi et al., 2004: 233-300). 
 
Example. Job Corps is the US largest vocationally-focused education and training programme 
for disadvantaged youths. Applicants must meet 11 criteria to be eligible for the programme: 
(1) be aged 16 to 24; (2) be a legal US resident; (3) be economically disadvantaged; (4) live in 
an environment characterised by a disruptive home life, high crime rates, or limited job 
opportunities; (5) need additional education, training, job skills; (6) be free of serious 
behavioural problems; (7) have a clean health history; (8) have an adequate child care plan 
(for those with children); (9) have registered with the Selective Service Board (if applicable); 
(10) have parental consent (for minors); and (11) be judged to have the capacity and 
aspirations to participate in Job Corps. 
The heart of Job Corps is the services provided at training centres where participants receive 
intensive vocational training, academic education and a wide range of other services, 
including counselling, social skills training, and health education. Furthermore, a unique 
feature of Job Corps is that most participants reside at the centre while training.  
Schochet et al. (2008) estimated the effectiveness of this programme using an experimental 
approach. This study is based on a representative US sample of eligible programme applicants. 
With a few exceptions, all eligible youths that applied to Job Corps between November 1994 
and December 1995 were randomly assigned to either a programme or control group. 
Programme group members (9.409 youths) were allowed to enrol in Job Corps; control group 
members (5.977 youths) were not for three years after random assignment. Using this 
approach, the authors find that Job Corps participation increases educational attainment, 
reduces criminal activity and increases earnings for several post-programme years. However, 
the authors conclude that these benefits are not sustainable (i.e. the programme’s costs exceed 
programme the resulting benefits), except for older workers. 
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2.4 The fundamental evaluation problem 
The main question of the evaluation problem is whether the outcome variable for a unit in the 
target population is affected by the participation to the programme. For instance, the main 
outcome of an ALMP for a participant to the programme could be the increased probability of 
employment or higher earnings after a certain number of months from the treatment. In this 
context, we would like to know the value of the participant’s outcome in the actual situation and 
the value of the outcome if (s)he had not participated in the programme. The fundamental 
evaluation problem arises because we never observe the same person in both states (i.e. 
participation and non-participation) at the same time (Hujer and Caliendo, 2000). Therefore, 
inference about the impact of a policy on the outcome of a unit in the target group involves 
speculation about how this unit would have performed in the absence of the treatment. The 
standard framework to formalise this problem is the counterfactual approach (also called the 
“potential outcome approach” or “Roy-Rubin model”). A counterfactual is a potential outcome, 
or the state of the affairs that would have happened in the absence of the cause (Shadish et al., 
2002). Thus, for a treated unit, a counterfactual is the potential outcome under the non-treatment 
state; conversely, for a non-participant unit, the counterfactual is the potential outcome under the 
treatment state. The key assumption of the counterfactual framework is that each unit in the 
target population has a potential outcome under each treatment state, even though each 
individual can be observed in only one treatment state at any point in time.  
 
2.5 Formalising the counterfactual approach 
The researcher observes the set of variables (, , ) for each unit in the population: (, , ), 
for i = 1, . . . , N.  is a dummy variable indicating whether the treatment has been received 
( = 1) or not ( = 0). Y is the outcome variable, i.e. the variable that is expected to be affected 
by the treatment.  X is a set of observable characteristics of the unit and, eventually, of higher 
levels such as households or local/regional characteristics4.  
Let (, ) be the two potential outcomes on the i-th population unit of being treated or not 
treated, respectively. If a specific member of the target population receives the treatment then  
is observable (≡ factual), while  is irreversibly non-observable and corresponds to what we 
would have observed if this unit had not received the intervention (≡ counterfactual). Similarly, if 
a specific member of the target population is not exposed to the treatment, it is possible to 
observe only   (≡ factual); in this case  is the outcome of that specific unit in the case it had 
been treated (≡ counterfactual). 
The identity that relates  , the real outcome that is observed on unit i of the target population, to 
the potential outcomes of the same unit is the following: 
                                                           
4
 X defines the set of observable characteristics and x a single observable variable. These variables are usually called 
explanatory variables or covariates. Examples of observable characteristics in labour market applied research are 
age, gender, level of education, employment status, income, and urban/rural area, among others. 
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[1]   =  + (1 − ) = 	 
		
	
 = 1
	 = 0 
where  is the treatment status of the i-th population unit:  = 1 if this unit received the 
intervention and 0 otherwise. Basically, the identity of equation [1] indicates which of the two 
outcomes will be observed in the data ( or ) depending on the treatment condition ( = 1 
or  = 0). The key message of this equation is that to infer a causal relationship between  (the 
cause) and  (the outcome) the analyst cannot directly link  and  under the condition 
 = 1; instead the analyst must check the outcome of  under the condition  = 0, and 
compare  with  (Guo and Fraser, 2010). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The estimation of a plausible value for the counterfactual  is the central object of the methods 
presented in this document. 
 
2.6 Average treatment effect 
Given that it is typically impossible to calculate individual-unit causal effects (and it is also less 
interesting from the policy point of view), the literature focuses its attention on the estimation of 
aggregated causal effects, usually alternative average causal effects. The two most commonly 
used are: the population average treatment effect (ATE) and the average effect on units in the 
target population that were assigned to treatment (ATT). With (. ) denoting the expectation 
operator, these two average parameters can be expressed as follows:  
[2] ATE = ( − ) = () − () 
[3] ATT = ( − | = 1) = (| = 1) − (| = 1) 
Identity [2], the ATE, represents the average effect that would result from having all population 
members taking part in the programme. The ATE is the parameter of interest when the 
Example. We might assume that a worker i with low education (i.e. ISCED 1 or 2) has also a 
low income. Here the treatment variable is   = 1 if the worker has a low level of education; 
the income  <  if the worker has low income, where p is a cutoff defining a low income, 
and  >  otherwise. To make a causal statement that being poorly educated ( = 1) 
causes low income  < , the researcher must examine the outcome under the status of not 
being poorly educated. That is, the task is to determine the worker’s salary  under the 
condition  = 0, and ask the question, “What would have happened had the worker had a 
medium-to-high level of education?” If the answer to the question is  > , than the 
researcher can have confidence that  = 1 causes  < .  The most critical issue is that  
is not observed (adapted from Guo and Fraser, 2010).  
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programme under consideration has universal applicability, in the sense that all the units in the 
population are exposed to the treatment. The ATT, identity [3], measures the average treatment 
effect for the units actually exposed to the intervention and is the parameter of major interest for 
policy evaluation. It is important to note that the first term of the identity defining the ATT 
((| = 1), the average effect on the treated) is observable (≡ factual outcome), while the 
second term ((| = 1), the average effect on the treated in the case they had not been 
treated) is not (≡ counterfactual outcome). Therefore the ATT cannot be directly identified. 
This report concerns solely the estimation of the ATT (and not of the ATE) as it is the most 
interesting parameter for a policy maker. 
 
2.7 Selection bias 
As the outcome of the counterfactual is not observable, one could take instead the outcome of 
non-participants as an approximation to the outcome that participants would have had without 
treatment. This would be a correct approach if (and only if) participants and non-participants 
have similar characteristics, i.e. if they are comparable a priori, had the treatment not been 
implemented. In general, however, participants and non-participants differ in crucial 
characteristics that are related both with the participation status and the outcome5. This problem 
is known as “selection bias”: a good example is the case where highly-skilled individuals have a 
higher probability of entering a training programme and also have a higher probability of finding 
a job (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                           
5
 Random assignment to the treatment status solves the selection problem because random assignment makes the 
treatment status ( = 1 or  = 0) independent of potential outcomes (see, for example, Angrist and Pischke, 2009: 
15-22). Randomising eliminates all systematic pre-existing group differences, because only chance determines 
which units are assigned to a given group. Consequently, each experimental group has the same expected values for 
all characteristics, observables or non-observables. Randomisation of a given sample may produce groups that differ 
by chance, however. These differences are random errors, not biases. The laws of probability ensure that the larger 
the number the units in the target population, the smaller pre-existing group differences are likely to be.  
Example. Suppose we have data on wages and personal characteristics of workers that include 
whether or not a worker is a union member. A naïve way of estimating the effect of 
unionisation on wages is to take the difference between the average wage of non-unionised 
workers ( = 0) and the average wage of unionized workers ( = 1). The problem with this 
approach relies on the fact that it treats the unionisation decision as exogenous, i.e. that is 
completely unrelated with other individual characteristics of the workers. In fact, there are 
many factors affecting a worker’s decision to join the union (Guo and Fraser, 2010) and 
therefore the selection bias should be taken into account. 
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Let us consider the observed difference between the average outcome of the treated units and the 
average outcome of the non-treated units: 
[4] (| = 1) − (| = 0) 
and subtract and add to it the counterfactual outcome for the treated units ((| = 1)):  
[5] (| = 1) − (| = 0) = 
= (| = 1) − (| = 1) + (| = 1) − (| = 0) 
 
 
 
 
 
Identity [5] tells us that the observed difference is equal to the average treatment effect on the 
treated units if and only if there is no selection bias. Thus, whether or not the observed difference 
in means between treated and non-treated units (≡ difference in mean factual outcomes) 
corresponds to the average treatment effect on the treated depends on having or not having 
selection bias. 
In the literature, estimating the counterfactual corresponds to overcoming the selection bias 
problem, therefore, all the policy evaluation methods that have been developed so far aim at 
solving it. 
 
3. Conditions for assessing the causal effect of public policies 
 
This section presents the two main assumptions that a researcher has to make to detect the causal 
effect of a public policy. 
 
3.1 Stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA) 
The first assumption embodies two conditions: (a) there is only one form of treatment and one 
form of non-treatment for each unit (≡ the treatment should not be “blurry”), and (b) there is no 
interference among units (≡ no interaction between units), in the sense that the outcome 
experienced by unit i is not influenced by the treatment state nor the outcome of any other 
member of the population.  
 
 
selection bias, i.e. 
the difference between treated and non-treated that would 
have been observed even if the policy had not taken place 
and depends on pre-existing differences between the two 
groups 
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3.2 Common support 
This assumption also embodies two conditions, the first being that both treated and non-treated 
units are observed. The second assumption states that for each treated unit there is a comparable 
non-treated unit, i.e. there is a non-treated unit with similar levels of the observable 
characteristics, , and with a similar probability of being treated. Formally: 
[6] Pr( = 1| < 1, 
that is, the probability of being exposed to the intervention for the unit i given  =  (i.e. gender 
= female) is below 1 meaning that there is at least one unit j with the same characteristics  (i.e. 
gender = female) that is not exposed to the treatment ( = 0.  
If the common support holds partially, that is just for a subset of values of X (i.e. only for 
females or only for males), the researcher has to restrict the analysis only to that subset.  
 
4. Balancing methods 
 
This section introduces four conventional methods that help reducing the selection bias (i.e. 
balancing the data): propensity score matching, regression discontinuity design, difference-in-
differences, and instrumental variables. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 - Balancing methods 
 
 
Random 
assignment with 
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NO SELECTION BIAS ATT=(Average effect on treated)  – (Average effect on non-treated) 
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Matching 
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The first two methods – the matching and the regression discontinuity design – can be applied 
when, in addition to the SUTVA and to the common support assumptions, the analyst knows and 
observes in the data all variables that influence the exposure to the treatment and the potential 
outcomes. This additional assumption – known as selection on observables6 – is difficult to 
defend in fields like education and the labour market where unobservable characteristics (like 
ability, motivation, and intelligence) more likely dictate individual behaviours. In these cases, 
when the analyst has the suspicion that the selection into treatment is driven by observable and 
unobservable factors, two other methods are available: the difference-in-differences or the 
instrumental variables approach (Figure 1). 
For sake of simplicity these methods are presented one by one, but they can be combined 
(indeed, they usually are) to tackle the evaluation problem under study. Unfortunately there is no 
established best practice on this: the evaluator has to decide whether and how to combine these 
methods. 
 
5. Propensity score matching (PSM)7  
 
The method of matching has achieved popularity more recently as a tool of evaluation. It 
assumes that selection can be explained purely in terms of observable characteristics. Applying 
this method is, in principle, simple. For every unit in the treatment group a matching unit (≡ 
twin) is found among the non-treatment group. The choice of the match is dictated by observable 
characteristics. What is required is to match each unit exposed to  the treatment with one or more 
non-treated units sharing similar observable characteristics. The degree of similarities between 
different units is measured on the basis of the probability of being exposed to the intervention 
given a set of observable characteristics not affected by the programme, the so called propensity 
score. The idea is to find, from a large group of non-participants, units that are observationally 
similar to participants in terms of characteristics not affected by the intervention. The mean 
effect of treatment can then be calculated as the average difference in outcomes between the 
treated and non-treated units after matching. 
The aim of this section is to introduce the steps an analyst has to follow in order to implement 
propensity score matching (subsection 5.1), to present some recent applications of this method 
(subsection 5.2), and to highlight the main hypotheses, data requirements and pro and cons of 
this method (subsection 5.3). 
                                                           
6
 A variety of terms have emerged to describe this assumption: unconfoundedness (Rosenbaum and Rubin,1983), 
selection on observables (Barnow et al., 1980), conditional independence (Lechner, 1999), and exogeneity (Imbens, 
2004). 
 
7
 From Caliendo M., Kopeinig, S. (2008). Some practical guidance for the implementation of propensity score 
matching. Journal of Economic Surveys, 22(1): 31-72. 
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5.1 Implementation steps 
Implementing PSM can be summarised in the 5-step process shown in Figure 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 - PSM: implementation steps 
 
Step 1: Propensity score estimation. The propensity score is the probability of a unit in the target 
group (treated and control units) to be treated given its observed characteristics ; formally: 
Pr	( = 1|). The propensity score is a balancing score in the sense that, as demonstrated by 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), if two units have similar propensity scores, than they are also 
similar with respect the set of covariates X used for its estimation.  
Step 2: Check overlap and common support. Comparing the incomparable must be avoided, i.e. 
only the subset of the comparison group that is comparable to the treatment group should be used 
in the analysis.  
Hence, an important step is to check if there is at least one treated unit and one non-treated unit 
for each value of the propensity score. Several methods are suggested in the literature, but the 
most straightforward one is a visual analysis of the density distribution of the propensity score in 
the two groups. Another possible method is based on comparing the minima and maxima of the 
propensity score in the treated and in the non-treated group. Both approaches require deleting all 
the observations whose propensity score is smaller than the minimum and larger than the 
maximum in the opposite group. 
 
Step 3: Choose a matching algorithm. The next step consists of matching treated and non-treated 
units that have similar propensity scores using an appropriate algorithm. Propensity score 
matching algorithms differ not only in the way they measure the degree of similarity between 
treated and non-treated units (i.e. the way they find twins between these two groups) but also 
with respect to the weight they assign to the matched units. The aim of this report is not to 
discuss the technical details of each estimator; rather to present the general ideas of each 
algorithm. 
a) Nearest-neighbour matching. The treated unit is matched with the unit in the comparison 
group that presents the closest estimated propensity score. Two variants are possible: 
Step 1: 
Propensity 
score 
estimation 
Step 2: 
Check 
overlap/common 
support 
Step 3: 
Choose a 
matching 
algorithm  
Step 4: 
Matching 
quality 
Step 5: 
Effect 
estimation 
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matching with replacement (an untreated unit can be used more than once as a match) 
and matching without replacement (an untreated unit can be used only once as a match). 
A problem related to matching without replacement is that estimates depend on the order 
in which observations get matched. Hence, when using this approach it should be ensured 
that the ordering is done randomly. 
b) Calliper and radius matching. Nearest-neighbour matching faces the risk of bad matches, 
if the closest neighbour is not sufficiently similar. This can be avoided by imposing the 
condition that, in order to be matched, the propensity score of treated and non-treated 
units should not differ, for example, by more than 5%. This tolerance level (5%) is called 
the calliper. The radius matching approach is a variant of calliper matching – the basic 
idea of this variant is to use not only the nearest neighbour within each calliper but all the 
units that are within the calliper. 
c) Kernel matching. The two matching algorithms discussed above have in common that 
only some observations from the comparison group are used to construct the 
counterfactual outcome of a treated unit. Kernel matching uses weighted averages of all 
individuals in the control group to construct the counterfactual outcome. Weights depend 
on the distance between each individual from the control group and the unit exposed to 
the treatment for which the counterfactual is estimated. The kernel function assigns 
higher weight to observations close in terms of propensity score to a treated individual 
and lower weight to more distant observations. 
The choice between different matching algorithms implies a trade-off between bias and variance 
reduction. For instance, nearest-neighbour matching only uses the participant and its closest 
neighbour. Therefore it minimises the bias but might also involve an efficiency loss, since a large 
number of close neighbours is disregarded. Kernel-based matching on the other hand uses more 
(all) non-participants for each participant, thereby reducing the variance but possibly increasing 
the bias. Finally, using the same non-treated unit more than once (nearest neighbour matching 
with replacement) can possibly improve matching quality, but it increases the variance (Caliendo 
et al, 2005). 
 
Step 4: Matching quality. The quality of the matching procedure is evaluated on the basis of its 
capability in balancing the control and the treatment groups with respect to the covariates used 
for the propensity score estimation. There are several procedures for this. The basic idea of all 
approaches is to compare the distribution of these covariates in the two groups before and after 
matching on the propensity score. If there are significant differences after matching, than 
matching on the propensity score was not (completely) successful in making the groups 
comparable and remedial measures have to be taken. 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) highlight that a good matching procedure should reduce the 
standardised bias for each of the covariates used in the estimation of the propensity scores. Thus, 
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this approach requires comparing the standardised bias for each covariate x before and after 
matching. The standardised bias before matching is given by: 
[7] Standardised bias before =  ̅"# ̅$%.&('"( )#'$( ))	 
The standardised bias after matching is given by: 
[8] Standardised bias after =  ̅"(# ̅$(%.&('"(( )#'$(( ))	 
where ̅	()) is the mean (variance) in the treatment group before matching and ̅	()) the 
analogue for the control group. ̅*	()*) and ̅*	()*) are the corresponding values for the 
matched samples. Even though this method does not provide any clear indication for the success 
of the matching procedure, most empirical studies consider as sufficient a standardised bias 
below 3% or 5% after matching.  
A similar approach uses a two-sample t-test to check if there are significant differences in 
covariate means for both groups. After matching the covariates should be balanced in both the 
treatment and the non-treatment group therefore no significant difference should be found. 
Additionally, Sianesi (2004) suggests to re-estimate the propensity score in the matched sample 
and compare the pseudo-R2’s  before and after matching.  After matching there should be no 
systematic differences in the distribution of the covariates between both groups. Therefore, the 
pseudo-R2 after matching should be fairly low. The same can be done inspecting the F-statistics 
before and after matching. In fact, these statistics indicate the joint significance of all regressors 
used for the estimation of the propensity score.  
 
Table 1. Pros and cons of the approaches commonly used to evaluate the quality of the 
matching procedure 
 Pros Cons 
Standardised 
bias Easy to compute 
- To be performed for each covariate 
used for the propensity score 
estimation 
- No objective indication of the 
success of the matching procedure  
t-test Easy to compute 
- To be performed for each covariate 
used for the propensity score 
estimation 
- The bias reduction is not clearly 
visible 
Joint 
significance 
test 
- Easy to compute 
- To be performed only once (jointly 
on all the covariates used for the 
propensity score estimation) 
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Step 5: Effect estimation. After the match has been judged of acceptable quality, computing the 
effect becomes a quite easy task:  it is enough to calculate the average of the difference between 
the outcome variable in the treated and non-treated groups.  
Before running a t-test to check the statistical significance of the effect, however, one needs to 
compute standard errors.  This is not straightforward. The problem is that the estimated variance 
of the treatment effect should also include the variance due to the estimation of the propensity 
score, the imputation of the common support, and possibly also the order in which treated 
individuals are matched. One way to deal with this problem is to use bootstrapping as suggested 
by Lechner (2002). Even though Imbens (2004) notes that there is in fact little formal evidence 
to justify bootstrapping, this method is widely applied. 
 
5.2 Selected applications 
 
Rinne, U., Schneider, M., Uhlendorff, A., (2011). Do the skilled and prime-aged unemployed 
benefit more from training? Effect heterogeneity of public training programmes in Germany. 
Applied Economics, 43 (25): 3465-3494 
Abstract. This study analyzes the treatment effects of public training programs for the 
unemployed in Germany. Based on propensity score matching methods we extend the picture 
that has been sketched in previous studies by estimating treatment effects of medium-term 
programs for different sub-groups with respect to vocational education and age. Our results 
indicate that program participation has a positive impact on employment probabilities for all sub-
groups. Participants also seem to find more often higher paid jobs than non-participants. 
However, we find only little evidence for the presence of heterogeneous treatment effects, and 
the magnitude of the differences is quite small. Our results are thus – at least in part – conflicting 
with the strategy to increasingly provide training to individuals with better employment 
prospects. 
 
Huber, M., Lechner, M., Wunsch, C., Walter, T., (2011). Do German welfare-to-work 
programmes reduce welfare dependency and increase employment? German Economic Review, 
12(2): 182-204. 
During the last decade, many Western economies reformed their welfare systems with the aim of 
activating welfare recipients by increasing welfare-to-work programmes (WTWP) and job-
search enforcement. We evaluate the short-term effects of three important German WTWP 
implemented after a major reform in January 2005 ('Hartz IV'), namely short training, further 
training with a planned duration of up to three months and public workfare programmes 
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('One-Euro-Jobs'). Our analysis is based on a combination of a large-scale survey and 
administrative data that is rich with respect to individual, household, agency level and regional 
information. We use this richness of the data to base the econometric evaluation on a selection-
on-observables approach. We find that short-term training programmes, on average, increase 
their participants' employment perspectives. There is also considerable effect heterogeneity 
across different subgroups of participants that could be exploited to improve the allocation of 
welfare recipients to the specific programmes and thus increase overall programme effectiveness. 
 
Nuria R., Benus, J., (2010). Evaluating Active Labor Market Programs in Romania. Empirical 
Economics, 38 (1): 65-84 
Abstract. We evaluate the presence of effects from joining one of four active labour market 
programs in Romania in the late 1990s compared to the no-program state. Using rich survey 
data and propensity score matching, we find that three programs (training and retraining, small 
business assistance, and employment and relocation services) had success in improving 
participants' economic outcomes and were cost-beneficial from society’s perspective. In contrast, 
public employment was found detrimental for the employment prospects of its participants. We 
also find that there is considerable heterogeneity, which suggests that targeting may improve the 
effectiveness of these programs.  
 
Jespersen, S.T., Munch, J.R., Skipper, L., (2008). Costs and benefits of Danish active labour 
market programmes. Labour Economics, 15(5): 859-884. 
Abstract. Since 1994, unemployed workers in the Danish labour market have participated in 
active labour market programmes on a large scale. This paper contributes with an assessment 
of costs and benefits of these programmes. Long-term treatment effects are estimated on a very 
detailed administrative dataset by propensity score matching. For the years 1995 - 2005 it is 
found that private job training programmes have substantial positive employment and earnings 
effects, but also public job training ends up with positive earnings effects. Classroom training 
does not significantly improve employment or earnings prospects in the long run. When the cost 
side is taken into account, private and public job training still come out with surplusses, while 
classroom training leads to a deficit. 
 
Sianesi, B. (2008). Differential effects of active labour market programs for the unemployed. 
Labour Economics, 15(3): 392-421. 
Abstract. The differential performance of six Swedish active labour market programs for the 
unemployed is investigated in terms of short- and long-term employment probability and un-
employment-benefit dependency. Both relative to one another and compared to more intense job 
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search, the central finding is that the more similar to a regular job, the more effective a program 
is for its participants. Employment subsidies perform best by far, followed by trainee 
replacement and, by a long stretch, labour market training. Relief work and two types of work 
practice schemes appear by contrast to be mainly used to re-qualify for unemployment benefits. 
 
Stenberg, A., Westerlund, O., (2008). Does comprehensive education work for the long-term 
unemployed? Labour Economics, 15(1): 54-67. 
Abstract. In this paper we evaluate the effects of comprehensive adult education on wage 
earnings of long-term unemployed, an essentially unexplored issue. We use register data 
pertaining to a large sample of long-term unemployed in Sweden who enrolled in upper 
secondary comprehensive adult education. Estimates with propensity score matching indicate 
that more than one semester of study results in substantial increases in post program annual 
earnings for both males and females. According to our rough calculations, the social benefits of 
offering these individuals comprehensive education surpass the costs within five to seven years. 
 
Fitzenberger, B., Speckesser, S., (2007). Employment effects of the provision of specific 
professional skills and techniques in Germany. Empirical Economics, 32(2-3): 529-573. 
Abstract. Based on unique administrative data, which has only recently become available, this 
paper estimates the employment effects of the most important type of public sector sponsored 
training in Germany, namely the provision of specific professional skills and techniques (SPST). 
Using the inflows into unemployment for the year 1993, the empirical analysis uses local linear 
matching based on the estimated propensity score to estimate the average treatment effect on the 
treated of SPST programs by elapsed duration of unemployment. The empirical results show a 
negative lock-in effect for the period right after the beginning of the program and significantly 
positive treatment effects on employment rates of about 10 percentage points and above a year 
after the beginning of the program. The general pattern of the estimated treatment effects is quite 
similar for the three time intervals of elapsed unemployment considered. The positive effects 
tend to persist almost completely until the end of our evaluation period. The positive effects are 
stronger in West Germany compared to East Germany. 
 
Winterhager, H., Heinze, A., Spermann, A., (2006). Deregulating job placement in Europe: A 
microeconometric evaluation of an innovative voucher scheme in Germany. Labour Economics, 
13(4): 505-517. 
Abstract. Job placement vouchers can be regarded as a tool to spur competition between public 
and private job placement activities. The German government launched this instrument in order 
to end the public placement monopoly and to subsidize its private competitors. We exploit very 
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rich administrative data provided for the first time by the Federal Employment Agency and apply 
propensity score matching as a method to solve the fundamental evaluation problem and to 
estimate the effect of the vouchers. We find positive treatment effects on the employment 
probability after one year of 6.5 percentage points in Western Germany and give a measure for 
deadweight loss. 
 
Nivorozhkin, A. (2005). An evaluation of government-sponsored vocational training 
programmes for the unemployed in urban Russia. Cambridge Journal of Economics, 29(6):1053-
1072. 
Abstract. This is the first study on the effects of active labour market programs such as 
training in Russia. We use the data from the official unemployment register combined with 
information from the follow-up survey in a large industrial city in the year 2000. The method of 
propensity score matching was applied to learn whether participation in the training programmes 
increased the monthly salaries of participants. The findings suggest that individuals tend to 
benefit from the participation in the training programmes. However, one year later, this effect 
disappeared.  
 
Caliendo, M., Hujer, R., Thomsen, S., (2005). The employment effects of job creation schemes in 
Germany. A microeconomic evaluation. Discussion Paper n. 1512, Bonn, IZA. 
(http://repec.iza.org/dp1512.pdf) 
Abstract. In this paper we evaluate the employment effects of job creation schemes on the 
participating individuals in Germany. Job creation schemes are a major element of active labour 
market policy in Germany and are targeted at long-term unemployed and other hard-to-place 
individuals. Access to very informative administrative data of the Federal Employment Agency 
justifies the application of a matching estimator and allows to account for individual (group-
specific) and regional effect heterogeneity. We extend previous studies in four directions. First, 
we are able to evaluate the effects on regular (unsubsidised) employment. Second, we observe 
the outcome of participants and non-participants for nearly three years after programme start and 
can therefore analyse mid- and long-term effects. Third, we test the sensitivity of the results with 
respect to various decisions which have to be made during implementation of the matching 
estimator, e.g. choosing the matching algorithm or estimating the propensity score. Finally, we 
check if a possible occurrence of 'unobserved heterogeneity' distorts our interpretation. The 
overall results are rather discouraging, since the employment effects are negative or insignificant 
for most of the analysed groups. One notable exception are long-term unemployed individuals 
who benefit from participation. Hence, one policy implication is to address programmes to this 
problem group more tightly. 
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Ohkusa,  Y., (2004). Programme evaluation of unemployment benefits in Japan. An average 
treatment effect approach. Japan and the World Economy, 16(1): 95-111. 
Abstract. Empirical results show that unemployment benefits (UB) recipients significantly 
change to worse job conditions with respect to wages and firm size, but change to better job 
conditions with respect to occupation, position, industry, and residence. While the effects for 
occupation are not significant, UB recipients have a significant tendency to stay the same. In 
other words, results of other conditions imply that they reduce the reservation wage to get better 
conditions with respect to occupation, industry, and residence. This means strong inertia in these 
aspects. 
 
Sianesi, B., (2004). An Evaluation of the Swedish System of Active Labor Market Programs in 
the 1990s. Review of Economics and Statistics, 86(1): 133-155. 
Abstract. We investigate the presence of short- and long-term effects from joining a Swedish 
labor market program vis-à-vis more intense job search in open unemployment. Overall, the 
impact of the program system is found to have been mixed. Joining a program has increased 
employment rates among participants, a result robust to a misclassification problem in the data. 
On the other hand it has also allowed participants to remain significantly longer on 
unemployment benefits and more generally in the unemployment system, this being particularly 
the case for those entitled individuals entering a program around the time of their unemployment 
benefits' exhaustion. 
 
Gerfin, M., Lechner, M., Steiger, H., (2002). Does subsidized temporary employment get the 
unemployed back to work? An econometric analysis of two different schemes. Discussion Paper 
n. 606, Bonn, IZA. 
(http://repec.iza.org/dp606.pdf) 
Abstract. Subsidized employment is an important tool of active labour market policies to 
improve the chances of the unemployed to find permanent employment. Using informative 
individual administrative data we investigate the effects of two different schemes of subsidized 
temporary employment implemented in Switzerland. One scheme operates as a non-profit 
employment programme (EP), whereas the other one is a subsidy for temporary jobs 
(TEMP) in firms operating in competitive markets. Using econometric matching methods we 
find that TEMP is considerably more successful in getting the unemployed back into work than 
EP. We also find that compared to nonparticipation both programmes are ineffective for 
unemployed who find job easily anyway as well as for those with short unemployment duration. 
For unemployed with potentially long unemployment duration and for actual long term 
unemployed, both programmes may have positive effects, but the effect of TEMP is much larger. 
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5.3 Synthesis: main hypotheses, data requirements, pros and cons 
 
Propensity score matching (PSM) 
Main hypotheses Data requirements Pros Cons 
Selection into treatment 
determined only by observable 
characteristics. 
The dataset contains all the 
variables describing the         
characteristics determining the 
selection into treatment. 
Long tradition in many fields 
(i.e. medicine, environmental 
studies, health economics, 
labour economics and the 
economics of education). 
In fields like the economics 
of education or labour 
economics the selection on 
observables hypothesis is 
difficult to defend. 
 For each value of the propensity 
score there is at least one treated 
unit and one non-treated unit. 
It controls for a set of 
covariates that simultaneously 
determine the selection into 
treatment. 
It is a data-consuming 
procedure: its conclusions 
hold only on the subset of 
matched units. 
 (Traditionally) cross-sectional data. Is a non-parametric approach, 
therefore very flexible (i.e. 
matching does not require any 
functional form assumptions 
for relationship linking the 
outcome variable with the 
covariates). 
The external validity 
(generalisability) of its 
results decreases when the 
share of unmatched units 
increases. 
   The estimated variance of 
the treatment effect should 
include the variance of the 
estimated propensity score: 
to our knowledge, there is 
no established procedure to 
do that. 
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6. Regression discontinuity design (RDD) 
 
Regression discontinuity (RDD) design has many of the assets of a randomised experiment, but 
can be used when random assignment is not feasible. It is a popular quasi-experimental design 
that exploits precise knowledge of the rules determining the eligibility into treatment.  
According to this design, assignment is solely based on pre-intervention variables observable by 
the analyst and the probability of participation changes discontinuously as a function of these 
variables. To fix ideas, consider the case in which a pool of individuals willing to participate is 
split into two groups according to whether a pre-intervention measure is above or below a known 
threshold. Those individuals scoring above the threshold are exposed to the intervention, while 
those who scoring below are denied it (Battistin and Rettore, 2008). RDD can be of two types: 
sharp and fuzzy.  
 
Sharp RDD is used when the treatment status is a deterministic discontinuous function of a 
covariate, 	(i.e. age, wage, length of the unemployment period, test scores, etc)8. Suppose, for 
example, that:  
[9]   =	 +01				


					 < ,
						 ≥ , 
where S is a known threshold or cutoff9. This eligibility mechanism is a deterministic function of 
 because once we know  	we know also . Treatment is a discontinuous function of  
	because no matter how close 	gets to S, the treatment status is unchanged until  = , (Angrist 
and Pischke, 2009)10. The main idea behind this design is that units in the target population just 
below the cutoff (which do not receive the intervention) are good comparisons to those just 
above the cutoff (which are exposed to the intervention). Thus, in this setting, the analyst can 
evaluate the impact of an intervention by comparing the average outcomes for the recipients just 
above the cutoff with those of non-recipients just below it.  That is, under certain comparability 
conditions, the assignment near the cutoff can be seen almost as random. These conditions go 
under the so called local continuity assumption requiring that: 
  [10] (| = ,)   and     (| = ,)  
are continuous in S.  
                                                           
8
 In this section, the variable that determines the eligibility to treatment is represented by x, one of the observed 
variables X.  is the individual realisation of this variable. 
9
 This threshold may represent a single characteristic or a composite indicator constructed using multiple 
characteristics.   
10
 From this it follows that there is no value of xi at which we observe both treated and  non-treated units; therefore, 
although sharp RD can be seen as a special case of selection on observables, common solutions to such selection 
problem (i.e. propensity score matching methods) are not applicable here because there is no region of common 
support. 
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The continuity assumption rules out coincidental functional discontinuities in the relationship 
between the selection variable x and the outcome of interest Y such as those caused by other 
interventions that use assignment mechanisms based on the same exact assignment variable and 
cutoff (Klaauw, 2008). 
From this discussion, it follows that the sharp RDD design captures the effect of an intervention 
only for the subpopulation with values of x near the threshold point (the so called Local Average 
Treatment Effect, LATE). In case of heterogeneous impacts, the local effect may be very 
different from the effect at values further away from the threshold. Hence, this approach, while 
characterised by high internal validity, may produce results that cannot be generalised to the 
entire target population. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fuzzy RDD is used when there is no full compliance to the eligibility rule. In this type of setting, 
the analyst may observe treated units when   < , or non-treated units when  ≥ , (one way 
non-compliance) or both, treated units when   < , and non-treated units when  ≥ , (two way 
non-compliance). In fuzzy RDD the propensity score function Pr	( = 1|)  is discontinuous at 
S as in the case of sharp RDD but, instead of a 0-1 step function, the treatment probability as a 
function of x now contains a jump at the cutoff that is less than 1. The Fuzzy design discontinuity 
is highly correlated with treatment leading to an instrumental variable type of setup. More 
specifically, in this setup the assignment variable  is used as an instrumental variable for 
program participation (see section 8). 
 
To conclude, both sharp and fuzzy approaches may be invalid research designs if the assignment 
variable can be manipulated by the units in the target population: in this case the existence of a 
treatment that is a discontinuous function of an assignment variable is not sufficient to justify the 
validity of a RDD design. 
 
The remainder of the section is organised as follow. Subsection 6.1 introduces the steps an 
analyst has to follow to implement RDD; subsection 6.2 presents some recent applications of this 
Example. Lemieux and Milligan (2005) studied a peculiar social policy implemented in the 
Canadian province of Quebec. This policy is peculiar in the sense that it pays much lower 
social assistance benefits to individuals without children who had not yet attained the age of 30 
and much higher social benefits to individuals without children aged 30 and above. Thus, in 
this case “age” is the selection variable and “age=30” is the cutoff. The authors used the 
regression discontinuity design approach to estimate the effect of the increased social 
assistance on employment within these age cohorts.  
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method; finally, subsection 6.3 highlights the main hypotheses, data requirement and pro and 
cons of the RDD. 
 
6.1 Implementation steps11 
This section describes the implementation steps an analyst has to follow to apply the regression 
discontinuity design (Figure 3). The illustration of these steps is based on Serrano-Valerde’s 
application “The Financing Structure of Corporate R&D - Evidence from Regression 
Discontinuity Design” (Serrano-Valerede, 2008) aiming at identifying the effect of R&D 
subsidies given by the French ANVAR programme (created in 1979) on firms’ R&D intensity.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 - RDD: implementation steps 
 
Step 1: Specify the selection variable and the threshold. The precondition for the applicability of 
the RDD is the presence of a continuous selection variable with a cutoff point splitting the units 
that are eligible for the treatment from the units that are not eligible. 
In order for a firm to be eligible for the ANVAR programme it has to be independent from a 
large business group (henceforth referred to as LBG). Independence is defined with respect to 
firms’ ownership structure, which becomes the selection variable.  According to the French law, 
a firm is independent if less than 25% of its capital is owned by a LBG. Thus 25% becomes the 
eligibility threshold. A firm owned at 26% by a LBG will be considered ineligible in this setting.  
 
Step 2: Choose the interval around the threshold. The author restricts the analysis to the 
subsample of private and non-agricultural firms which have 0% < x < 50% ownership by a LBG. 
Thus, a firm is eligible for the treatment when the share of its capital that is owned by a LBG 
does not exceed 25%; similarly, a firm is ineligible when the share of its capital that is owned by 
a LBG is between 26% and 50%.  
                                                           
11
 This section is heavily based on DG REGIO’s EVALSED project. 
(http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/evaluation/evalsed/sourcebooks/method_techniques/index_en.
htm) 
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The study further distinguishes between four bandwidths around the threshold: Large (0% < x < 
50%), Intermediate (5% < x < 45%), Small (10% < x < 40%), and Very Small (15% < x < 35%). 
The smaller the bandwidth, the more likely are the conditions of a quasi-experiment; but it 
should be remembered that the smaller the bandwidth, the smaller the external-validity of the 
results of the analysis will be. 
 
Step 3: Check the type of discontinuity: sharp or fuzzy? Serrano-Valerede’s work represents an 
intermediate case between sharp and fuzzy RDD designs. In this setting, ineligible firms have 
zero probability of receiving the subsidy, while some firms in the treatment group may not 
receive it (because they do not apply for it or because they do not get it). The group of eligible 
firms that are not treated are often referred to as “no shows” (Bloom, 1984). In other words, 
eligible firms have a positive assignment to treatment less than one, in the sense that only a small 
fraction of eligible firms takes up the subsidy. Battistin and Rettore (2008) show that the 
conditions required to achieve identification in this setting (often called Fuzzy type 1 RDD) are 
the same as in the sharp design. They show formally that, thanks to the discontinuity, eligible 
non-treated and ineligible firms are valid counterfactuals for supported firms, independently on 
how these supported firms self-select into the programme. 
 
Step 4: Effect estimation. The author estimates a particular type of regression model, defined as a 
quantile regression. The purpose is to go beyond the effect of the subsidy on the R&D 
expenditure of the average firms, estimating the effect on firms that are located at the 25%, 50% 
and 75% percentile of the R&D expenditure. The following table summarises the results of the 
estimates by bandwidth and by quantile. 
 
Table 2. Quantile regression estimates 
 Quantiles 
Bandwidth 25 percentile 50 percentile 75 percentile Observations 
Large 
(0%<X<50%) 
1.12 -0.13 1.13 
560 (0.29) (1.16) (2.01) 
Intermediate 
(5%<X<45%) 
1.17 -1.15 2.55 
380 (0.23) (1.5) (4.93) 
Small 
(10%<X<40%) 
1.10 -.84 1.78 
276 (0.23) (1.5) (4.93) 
Very small 
(15%<X<35%) 
1.33 -2.7 -4.0 
189 (0.4) (1.6) (1.21) 
Source: Serrano-Valerede, 2008, p. 21. 
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As shown in Table 2, the author finds a statistically significant positive effect of the R&D 
subsidy on private R&D investment only for firms at the lowest quartile of the private R&D 
investment distribution (25 percentile).  
 
Step 5. Discuss the external validity of the effect estimates. In presence of heterogeneous effects, 
the RDD only permits the identification of the mean impact at the threshold for the selection. In 
the realistic situation of heterogeneous effects across units, the estimated local effect might be 
very different from the effect for units away from the threshold for selection (Battistin and 
Rettore, 2008). Thus, the analyst should ascertain whether, and under which conditions, the 
results at the threshold can be extended to the whole population of interest. 
 
6.2 Selected applications 
 
Schwartz, J., (2013). Do temporary extensions to unemployment insurance benefits matter? The 
effects of the US standby extended benefit program. Applied Economics, 45(9): 1167-1183. 
Abstract. During the 2007-2010 economic downturn, the US temporarily increased the duration 
of Unemployment Insurance (UI) by 73 weeks, higher than any prior extension, raising concerns 
about UI's disincentive effects on job search. This article examines the effect of temporary 
benefit extensions using a Regression Discontinuity (RD) approach that addresses the 
endogeneity of benefit extensions and labour market conditions. Using data from the 1991 
recession, the results indicate that the Stand-by Extended Benefit (SEB) program has a 
significant, although somewhat limited, impact on county unemployment rates and the duration 
of unemployment. The results suggest that the temporary nature of SEB benefit extensions may 
mitigate their effect on search behaviour. 
 
Marie, O., Vall Castello, J., (2012). Measuring the (income) effect of disability insurance 
generosity on labour market participation. Journal of Public Economics, 96 (1-2): 198-210. 
Abstract. We analyze the employment effect of a law that provides for a 36% increase in the 
generosity of disability insurance (DI) for claimants who are, as a result of their lack of skills 
and of the labour market conditions they face, deemed unlikely to find a job. The selection 
process for treatment is therefore conditional on having a low probability of employment, 
making evaluation of its effect intrinsically difficult. We exploit the fact that the benefit increase 
is only available to individuals aged 55 or older, estimating its impact using a regression 
discontinuity approach. Our first results indicate a large drop in employment for disabled 
individuals who receive the increase in the benefit. Testing for the linearity of covariates around 
the eligibility age threshold reveals that the age at which individuals start claiming DI is not 
29 
 
continuous: the benefit increase appears to accelerate the entry rate of individuals aged 55 or 
over. We obtain new estimates excluding this group of claimants, and find that the policy 
decreases the employment probability by 8%. We conclude that the observed DI generosity 
elasticity of 0.22 on labour market participation is mostly due to income effects since benefit 
receipt is not work contingent in the system studied. 
 
Bargain, O., Doorley, K., (2011). Caught in the trap? Welfare's disincentive and the labor supply 
of single men. Journal of Public Economics, 95(9-10): 1096-1110. 
Abstract. Youth unemployment is particularly large in many industrialized countries and has 
dramatic consequences in both the short and long-term. While there is abundant evidence about 
the labor supply of married women and single mothers, little is known about how young 
(childless) singles react to financial incentives. The French minimum income (Revenu 
Minimum d'Insertion, RMI), often accused of generating strong disincentives to work, offers a 
natural setting to study this question since childless single individuals, primarily males, 
constitute the core group of recipients. Exploiting the fact that childless adults under age 25 are 
not eligible for this program, we conduct a regression discontinuity analysis using French Census 
data. We find that the RMI reduces the participation of uneducated single men by 7-10% at age 
25. We conduct an extensive robustness check and discuss the implications of our results for 
youth unemployment and current policy developments. 
 
Lalive, R., (2008). How do extended benefits affect unemployment duration? A regression 
discontinuity approach. Journal of Econometrics, 142 (2): 785-806. 
Abstract. This paper studies a targeted program that extends the maximum duration of 
unemployment benefits from 30 weeks to 209 weeks in Austria. Sharp discontinuities in 
treatment assignment at age 50 and at the border between eligible regions and control regions 
identify the effect of extended benefits on unemployment duration. Results indicate that the 
duration of job search is prolonged by at least 0.09 weeks per additional week of benefits among 
men, whereas unemployment duration increases by at least 0.32 weeks per additional week of 
benefits for women. This finding is consistent with a lower early retirement age applying to 
women. 
 
Chen, S., van der Klaauw, W., (2008). The work disincentive effects of the disability insurance 
program in the 1990s. Journal of Econometrics, 142(2): 757-784. 
Abstract. In this paper we evaluate the work disincentive effects of the disability insurance 
(DI) program during the 1990s using comparison group and regression-discontinuity methods. 
The latter approach exploits a particular feature of the DI eligibility determination process to 
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estimate the program's impact on labor supply for an important subset of DI applicants. Using 
merged survey-administrative data, we find that during the 1990s the labor force participation 
rate of DI beneficiaries would have been at most 20 percentage points higher had none received 
benefits. In addition, we find even smaller labor supply responses for the subset of 'marginal' 
applicants whose disability determination is based on vocational factors. 
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6.3 Synthesis: main hypotheses, data requirements, pros and cons 
 
Regression discontinuity design 
Main hypotheses Data requirements Pros Cons 
Assignment is solely based on 
pre-intervention variables 
observable to the analyst and 
the probability of participation 
changes discontinuously as a 
function of these variables. 
The dataset contains the selection 
variable and observations on 
eligible and non-eligible units. 
In a neighbourhood of the cut-
off for selection a RDD 
presents of a pure experiment. 
Limited external validity of 
the estimates. 
 (Traditionally) cross-sectional data. This design allows one to 
identify the programme’s 
causal effect without imposing 
arbitrary exclusion restrictions, 
assumptions on the selection 
process, functional forms, or 
distributional assumptions on 
errors. 
To extend the results at the 
threshold to the whole 
population one can only 
resort to a non-
experimental estimator 
whose consistency for the 
intended impact 
intrinsically depends on 
behavioural (and non-
testable) assumptions. 
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7. Difference-in-Differences (DID) 
 
The Difference-in-Differences (DID) method explores the time dimension of the data to 
define the counterfactual. It requires having data for both treated and control groups, before 
and after the treatment takes place. The .//010 is estimated by comparing the difference in 
outcomes between treated and control groups in some period after the participants have 
completed the programme with the difference that existed before the programme. It 
acknowledges the presence of unobserved heterogeneity in the selection into treatment, 
ensuring the estimation of the true ATT if this selection bias is constant over time as it is 
differenced out. Longitudinal data, in which the same individuals are followed over time, is 
usually used but it can also be applied to repeated cross-sectional data. Compared to cross-
section estimators it has the advantage of controlling for differences in unobservable 
characteristics that are fixed over time, i.e. a specific form of selection on unobservables. 
The treatment effect is obtained by taking two differences between group means. In a first 
step, the before-after mean difference is computed for each group: (23 − 43 | = 1)	and 
526 − 46 | = 07, where the subscripts a and b denote “after” and “before” the policy 
intervention, and the superscripts T and C indicate the treatment and the control group, 
respectively. The average treatment effect on the treated is the difference of these two 
differences: 
[11]  .//010 = (23 − 43 | = 1) − 526 − 46| = 07 , 
 
This method relies on two main assumptions: 
1. The unobserved heterogeneity is time invariant and is cancelled out by comparing the 
before and after situations; 
2. The so called common trend: in the absence of the treatment, both treated and control 
groups would have experienced over time the same trend in the outcome variable. 
Therefore, any deviation from the trend observed in the treated group can be 
interpreted as the effect of the treatment.  
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An Example 
For graphical illustration consider the example in the following figure, where the mean 
outcomes are on the vertical axis and time is on the horizontal one.  
 
Figure 4 - An example of DID (part 1) 
 
The period of the intervention is indicated as ‘k’, and ‘b’ and ‘a’ are the before and after 
points in time for which data are available. The before and after mean outcomes for the 
treated units are 43 and 23, respectively. The correspondent outcomes for the control group 
are	46 and 26. The ATT effect is computed according to equation [11] above. In order to 
identify the ATT in the figure it is important to recall the common trend assumption, stating 
that the trend on the outcome would be the same for treated and control groups in the absence 
of the treatment (dashed dark line in figure 5 below). Accordingly, ′ in figure 5 is defined as 
the outcome of the treated individuals had they not received the treatment and the common 
trend assumption can be written as: 26 − 46 = ′ − 43. The ATT corresponds to the 
difference between the actual outcome of the treated group and the outcome they would have 
experienced had they not received the treatment: 23 − ′, i.e. the excess outcome change for 
the treated as compared to the non-treated. 
 
Figure 5 - An example of DID (part 2) 
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The remainder of the section is organised as follows: subsection 7.1 presents the steps for the 
implementation of this method; subsection 7.2 presents some recent applications; and, 
subsection 7.3 highlights the main hypotheses, data requirement and pros and cons of the 
DID approach. 
 
7.1 Implementation steps 
The following figure presents the estimation steps of the Difference-in-Differences method. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6 – DID implementation steps 
 
Step 1: Choose the periods before and after the intervention  
This choice is usually limited by data availability. 
 
Step 2: Discuss and test the common trend assumption 
If data are available for the outcome of both groups in pre-programme periods other than the 
one used to estimate .//010 (see identity [11]), the validity of the common trend assumption 
may be tested. When applied to pre-programme periods only, the .//010 should be zero, as 
no programme has yet been implemented.  
 
If, due to some unobservable characteristics, the treated and control groups respond 
differently to a common shock (e.g. a macroeconomic shock), the common trend assumption 
is violated and DID would either under or overestimate the ATT. To overcome this problem, 
Bell, Blundell and van Reenen (1999) suggest a ‘trend adjustment’ technique: a triple 
difference method to account for these differential time-trend effects. In this case, data on 
both treated and control groups are needed not only in the before and after periods but also on 
other two periods, say 9 and 9: (9: < 9 < ; < < < =). The triple differences estimator, DDD 
(Differences-in-Differences-in-Differences), is: 
 
[12]  .//000 =							 >(23 − 43 | = 1) − 526 − 46 | = 07? 			−		 
                                                 −5@3 − @A3 B = 17 − 5@6 − @:6 | = 07 
Step 1: 
Choose the  
periods before 
and after the 
intervention 
Step 2: 
Discuss and 
 test the  
common trend  
assumption 
Step 3: 
Effect 
Estimation 
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where the last term is the trend differential between the two groups, measured between t and 
tʹ. 
Step 3: Effect estimation 
The .//010 is usually estimated within a regression framework. The key independent 
variables are: an indicator for members of the treated group, /@; an indicator of the post-
treatment period, 9; the interaction of treatment group status and post-programme period, 
/@9. 
[13]   @ = C + D/@9 + E/@ + F9 + G@,   
The coefficient of the interaction term, β, is the .//010 as it measures the difference between 
the two groups in the post-programme relative to the pre-programme. This parametric 
approach is convenient for two reasons: i) for the estimation of standard errors; and ii) 
because it is a more flexible approach that allows including other explanatory variables, 
namely those that reflect differences between the groups’ initial conditions and those that 
would lead to differential time trends.  
 
Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1997) suggested a combination between DID and matching 
methods to guarantee that only treated and control units comparable in the pre-treatment 
stage are taken into account in the estimation of the treatment effect. Smith and Todd (2005) 
show that this “conditional DID” is more robust than the traditional cross-section matching 
estimators, as it allows selection on observables as well as time-invariant selection on 
unobservables. To implement this combined approach one should match treated with control 
units based on pre-programme characteristics, and only units falling within the common 
support are used to compute the treatment effect (see the section dedicated to Matching). 
This combination of methods allows implementing DID in repeated cross-sectional data. 
Since with this type of data the units are not followed through time, the treated units after 
implementation must be matched with three groups of units: i) participants in the pre-
programme period; ii) control units in the pre-programme period; and iii) control units in the 
post-programme period.  
 
7.2 Selected Applications 
 
Bell, B., Blundell, R. and van Reenen, J., (1999). Getting the unemployed back to work: the 
role of wage subsidies. International Tax and Public Finance, vol. 6 (3): 339-360  
Abstract. This paper examines alternative approaches to wage subsidy programmes. It does 
this in the context of a recent active labour market reform for the young unemployed in 
Britain. This New Deal  reform and the characteristics of the target group are examined in 
detail. We discuss theoretical considerations, the existing empirical evidence and propose two 
strategies for evaluation. The first suggests an ex-post trend adjusted difference in 
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difference’ estimator. The second, relates to a model based ex-ante evaluation. We present 
the conditions for each to provide a reliable evaluation and fit some of the crucial parameters 
using data from the British Labour Force Survey. We stress that the success of this type of 
labour market programmes hinge on dynamic aspects of the youth labour market, in 
particular the pay-off to experience and training. 
 
Bergemann, A., Fitzenberger, B. and Speckesser, S., (2009). Evaluating the dynamic 
employment effects of training programs in East Germany using conditional difference-in-
differences. Journal of Applied Econometrics, vol. 24 (5): 797-82 
Abstract. This study analyzes the employment effects of training in East Germany. We 
propose and apply an extension of the widely used conditional difference-in-differences 
estimator. Focusing on transition rates between nonemployment and employment, we take 
into account that employment is a state- and duration-dependent process. Our results show 
that using transition rates is more informative than using unconditional employment rates as 
commonly done in the literature. Moreover, the results indicate that due to the labor market 
turbulence during the East German transformation process the focus on labor market 
dynamics is important. Training as a first participation in a program of Active Labor Market 
Policies shows zero to positive effects both on re-employment probabilities and on 
probabilities of remaining employed with notable variation over the different start dates of 
the program. 
 
Blundell, R., Costa Dias, M., Meghir, C. and van Reenen, J., (2004). Evaluating the 
employment impact of a mandatory job search program. Journal of the European Economic 
Association, vol. 2 (4): 596-606 
Abstract. This paper exploits area-based piloting and age-related eligibility rules to identify 
treatment effects of a labor market program—the New Deal for Young People in the UK. A 
central focus is on substitution/displacement effects and on equilibrium wage effects. The 
program includes extensive job assistance and wage subsidies to employers. We find that 
the impact of the program significantly raised transitions to employment by about 5 
percentage points. The impact is robust to a wide variety of nonexperimental estimators. 
However, we present some evidence that this effect may not be as large in the longer run. 
 
Boeri, T. and Jimeno, J., (2005). The effects of employment protection: learning from 
variable enforcement. European Economic Review, vol. 49: 2057-2077 
Abstract. Employment protection legislation (EPL) is not enforced uniformly across the 
board. There are a number of exemptions to the coverage of these provisions: firms below a 
given threshold scale and workers with temporary contracts are not subject to the most 
restrictive provisions. This within-country variation in enforcement allows us to make 
inferences on the impact of EPL which go beyond the usual cross-country approach. In this 
paper we develop a simple model which explains why these exemptions are in place to start 
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with. Then we empirically assess the effects of EPL on dismissal probabilities and on the 
equilibrium size distribution of firms. Our results are in line with the predictions of the 
theoretical model. Workers under permanent contracts in firms with less restrictive EPL are 
more likely to be dismissed. However, there is no effect of the exemption threshold on the 
growth of firms. 
 
Boockmann, B., Zwick, T., Ammermuller, A. and Maier, M., (2007). Do hiring subsidies 
reduce unemployment among the elderly? Evidence from two natural experiments. 
Discussion Paper n. 07-001, ZEW – Centre for European Economic Research 
(ftp://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp07001.pdf) 
Abstract. We estimate the effects of hiring subsidies for older workers on transitions from 
unemployment to employment in Germany. Using a natural experiment, our first set of 
estimates is based on a legal change extending the group of eligible unemployed persons. A 
subsequent legal change in the opposite direction is used to validate these results. Our data 
cover the population of unemployed jobseekers in Germany and was specifically made 
available for our purposes from administrative data. Consistent support for an employment 
effect of hiring subsidies can only be found for women in East Germany. Concerning other 
population groups, firms´ hiring behavior is hardly influenced by the program and hiring 
subsidies mainly lead to deadweight effects.  
 
Eichler, M. and Lechner, M., (2002). An Evaluation of public employment programmes in 
the East German state of Sachsen-Anhalt. Labour Economics: An International Journal, vol. 
9: 143-186 
Abstract. In East Germany, active labour market policies (ALMPs) have been used on a large 
scale to contain the widespread unemployment that emerged after unification. This paper 
evaluates the effects for participants in public employment programmes (PEPs), an 
important component of ALMP in the East German States (Länder). The paper focuses on 
individual unemployment probabilities. By concentrating on the state of Sachsen-Anhalt, the 
econometric analysis can use a large new panel data set available only for that state, the 
Arbeitsmarktmonitor Sachsen-Anhalt. We aim at nonparametric identification of the effects 
of PEPs by combining the use of comparison groups with differencing over time to correct 
for selection effects. Our results indicate that PEP participation reduces participants’ 
probability of unemployment. 
 
Forslund, A., Johansson, P. and Lindqvist, L., (2004). Employment subsidies – A fast lane 
from unemployment to work? IFAU Working Paper 2004, n. 18, Uppsala 
(http://www.ifau.se/upload/pdf/se/2004/wp04-18.pdf) 
Abstract. The treatment effect of a Swedish employment subsidy is estimated using exact 
covariate-matching and instrumental variables methods. Our estimates suggest that the 
programme had a positive treatment effect for the participants. We also show how non-
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parametric methods can be used to estimate the time profile of treatment effects as well as 
how to estimate the effect of entering the programme at different points in time in the 
unemployment spell. Our main results are derived using matching methods. However, as a 
sensitivity test, we apply instrumental variables difference-indifference methods. These 
estimates indicate that our matching results are robust. 
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7.3 Synthesis: main hypotheses, data requirements, pros and cons 
 
Difference-in-Differences (DID) 
Main hypotheses Data requirements Pros Cons 
- The selection into treatment is 
based on time-invariant 
unobserved heterogeneity. 
- Common trend: in the absence 
of the treatment both groups 
would evolve similarly over 
time. 
The method explores the time 
dimension of data, therefore requires 
either longitudinal or repeated cross-
sectional data. 
Allows for a specific form of 
unobserved heterogeneity: a 
time-invariant one. 
The selection into treatment 
may be based on unobserved 
temporary individual 
characteristics which are not 
differenced out, leading to an 
error in the estimation of the 
ATT. 
 The treatment must have occurred 
between two periods observed by the 
researcher. 
Easy to test the common trend 
assumption if another pre-period 
data point is available (the DD 
estimator between these two pre-
period time periods should be 
zero). 
The common trend 
assumption might not be 
verified or might not be 
testable. 
  Allows the combination with 
matching estimators to guarantee 
more comparability between 
treated and control groups. 
More demanding on data 
availability: needs data from 
two data collection periods 
(longitudinal or repeated 
cross-section). 
  It is a flexible approach allowing 
an illustrative interpretation. 
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8. Instrumental Variables (IV) 
 
The instrumental variable method deals directly with the selection on unobservables and is 
extensively discussed in Imbens and Angrist (1994) and Angrist, Imbens and Rubin (1996). 
The .//1' is identified if the researcher finds a variable, the instrument, which affects the 
selection into treatment but is not directly related with the outcome of interest or with the 
unobserved variables that determine it. The instrument is a source of exogenous variation that 
is used to approximate randomisation (Blundell and Costa Dias, 2008). The choice of the 
instrument is the most crucial step in the implementation of this method, and should be 
carefully motivated by economic intuition or theory. 
 
The estimation of the .//1' is achieved through a linear regression model: 
[14]   = C + D + E + G,  
where the parameter of interest is β: the effect of the treatment on the outcome, keeping other 
pre-determined variables  constant.  
In general, in non-experimental settings there is selection bias into treatment, namely 
selection on unobservable variables. Therefore, variables that affect simultaneously the 
outcome and the selection into treatment are often unobservable by the researcher (for 
instance innate ability or motivation). If the role of these unobservable variables is not taken 
into account, the ATT estimate will be wrong: it will either be over or underestimated. For 
example, consider a training programme targeted to unemployed individuals and suppose that 
motivation, a variable that cannot be observed by the researcher, affects both the probability 
of an individual applying to this programme and the future probability of finding a job (the 
outcome of interest). If this selection on unobservables is not dealt with, the ATT would be 
overestimated, as the role of motivation in finding a job would be attributed to the 
participation in the programme. 
 
The IV approach aims at cleaning this selection on unobservables by using a so-called 
instrumental variable	H12 that satisfies the following conditions: 
1) It should affect the selection into treatment: JKL(H, ) ≠ 0; 
2) It does not make part of model [14]: JKL(H, N) = 0, also called exclusion restriction. 
This condition rules out any direct effect of the instrument on the outcome and any 
indirect effect through another variable other than . 
 
Following the example given above, the researcher must find an observed variable H that: i) 
affects the decision to apply to the programme; ii) is not directly related to the probability of 
                                                            
12
 For simplicity the case with only one instrumental variable is presented, but there may exist more than one 
instrument.  
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finding a job in the future; and iii) is not related with the individual motivation. An example 
of such a variable might potentially be the distance the individual lives from the training 
centre, if observable. There is no obvious reason to believe that this distance is related to 
motivation or to probability of finding a job, but this belief should be discussed, explained 
and explored in the data in an exhaustive way. 
 
The IV method identifies ATT using only the part of the variation in treatment status that is 
associated with H. One of the most used implementation procedures is the two stage least 
squares (2SLS), in which the estimation of the parameter of interest occurs in two stages. 
First, the part of the treatment variable, , that is independent of the unobserved 
characteristics affecting the outcome, G, is isolated. This is done by estimating a first stage 
regression, in which the treatment variable is explained by the instrument, H, and by the other 
exogenous covariates, : 
[15]   = F + FH + FO + P.  
The fitted values of this regression Q 	reflect only the exogenous variation in the treatment. In 
the second stage, these fitted values are included in equation [14] as substitutes of . The 
estimation of these two stage least squares (2SLS) should not be made manually by the 
researcher because, even though the coefficients would be correct, the standard errors would 
be wrong. This occurs because in the second stage it would not be taken into account that the  
Q	were estimated. The estimation should be made using software package’s specific 
commands (for instance the command ‘ivregress’ in STATA) to guarantee the correct 
estimation of standard errors. 
 
It should be highlighted that the estimated ATT will depend on the particular instrumental 
variable used, as different instruments may induce different variation in the treatment 
variable.  
Furthermore, if the impact of the treatment programme is the same for all individuals then the 
IV approach estimates the ATT. However, if the treatment has heterogeneous effects in the 
population, this method estimates a local treatment effect, the so called Local Average 
Treatment Effect (LATE). This estimator identifies the treatment effect only for the units that 
switch their treatment status from non-participation to participation due to the change in the 
instrument, but it does not identify the treatment effect for those who would always 
participate in the programme regardless of the instrument variation (Imbens and Angrist, 
1994). While this fact is usually interpreted as a disadvantage of the IV method, the parameter 
estimated may be interesting for policy makers. For instance, when the instrument is a 
discrete variable, say a policy change, LATE will estimate the effect of treatment on 
individuals changing their treatment status in response to the policy change, which may give 
an important measure of the impact of the policy (Blundell and Costa Dias, 2008).   
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The remainder of the section is organised as follows: subsection 8.1 presents the steps for the 
implementation of this method; subsection 8.2 presents some recent applications; and 
subsection 8.3 highlights the main hypotheses, data requirement and pro and cons of the IV 
approach. 
 
8.1 Implementation steps 
Figure 7 presents the suggested steps for the estimation of the ATT using the instrumental 
variable method.  
  
 
 
 
Figure 7 – IV implementation steps 
 
Step1: Choice of the instrumental variables 
The choice of the instrument is crucial to ensure the estimation of the causal treatment effect. 
In general, having detailed information on how the policy was targeted and implemented may 
reveal sources of exogenous variation that could be used as instrumental variables. Common 
sources of instruments include: 
- Policy geographical variation  
For instance, if for exogenous reasons, the policy is implemented only in some 
regions and not in others, such that only part of the population is exposed to the 
policy 
- Exogenous shocks affecting the timing of policy implementation 
For instance, if for exogenous reasons, the implementation of the policy was delayed 
in one region or for some group of the population. 
- Policy eligibility rules  
If the policy is designed such that some units are eligible while others are not 
(parallel with the Regression Discontinuity Design method). 
 
Step 2: Effect Estimation 
Use specialised software (e.g. STATA or SAS) to estimate the two-stage least squares. The 
estimated parameter of interest is: 
[16]  .//1' = RST(U,V)RST(0,V) = .// +
RST(W,V)
RST(0,V) .   
Step 1: 
Choose the 
instrumental 
variable/ 
variables 
Step 2: 
Effect  
estimation 
Step 3: 
Check the first stage to 
assess the relation 
between the instrument 
and the treatment 
Step 4: 
Discuss the 
exclusion 
restriction 
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This equation highlights the crucial role of the two assumptions presented above. If either is 
not met, the estimated .//1' will be different from the true one. Thus, it is important that the 
researcher discusses the reliability of these two assumptions. 
 
Step 3: Check the first stage to assess the relation between the instrument and the treatment 
The first assumption, stating that the instrument should be related with the treatment, is 
testable by analysing the first stage regression and assessing the strength of the relation 
between the treatment and the instrumental variables. If the instrument is weak in predicting 
the treatment, the estimation of the ATT is seriously affected.  
The usual rule of thumb is that the F-statistic associated with the instrumental variable should 
be higher than 10 (Stock and Yogo, 2005). In case of weak instruments the bias of the 
estimated ATT could be even larger than the one obtained from not taking into account the 
selection on unobservables at all. Furthermore, even if JKL(G , H) = 0 such that .//1' =
.//, the standard errors will increase because the treatment would be imprecisely predicted. 
 
Step 4: Discuss the exclusion restriction 
Even though the assumption that the instrument is not related with the error term is not 
directly testable, the researcher should discuss extensively why it is believed that the 
instrumental variable and the error term are not correlated, relying for instance on economic 
theory and intuition.  
For instance, in the example above in which “distance” was suggested has a possible 
instrument, it could be argued that the individual could have moved to a particular part of the 
country where the training programmes are more usually offered. This would violate the 
assumption that motivation is not related with distance. Another example is when the training 
programmes are systematically given in more dynamic geographical areas from the economic 
point of view, for instance where it is more likely to find a job. If this is the case, there would 
exist a relation between distance and the outcome variable. These conjectures should be 
discussed and, if possible, proven to be right or wrong using the available data or alternative 
evidence. 
 
8.2 Selected Applications 
 
Abadie, A., Angrist, J. and Imbens, G., (2002). Instrumental variables estimates of the effect 
of subsidized training on the quantiles of trainee earnings. Econometrica, vol. 70 (1): 91-117 
Abstract: This paper reports estimates of the effects of JTPA training programs on the 
distribution of earnings. The estimation uses a new instrumental variable (IV) method that 
measures program impacts on quantiles. The quantile treatment effects (QTE) estimator 
reduces to quantile regression when selection for treatment is exogenously determined. QTE 
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can be computed as the solution to a convex linear programming problem, although this 
requires first-step estimation of a nuisance function. We develop distribution theory for the 
case where the first step is estimated nonparametrically. For women, the empirical results 
show that the JTPA program had the largest proportional impact at low quantiles. Perhaps 
surprisingly, however, JTPA training raised the quantiles of earnings for men only in the 
upper half of the trainee earnings distribution. 
 
Carling, K. and Pastore, F. (1999). Self-employment grants vs. subsidized employment: Is 
there a difference in the re-unemployment risk? IFAU Working Paper 1999: 6, Uppsala 
(http://www.ifau.se/upload/pdf/se/to2000/wp99-6.pdf) 
Abstract. Self-employment grants and employment subsidies are active labor market 
programs that aim at helping unemployed workers to escape unemployment by becoming 
self-employed or being hired at an initially reduced cost for the employer. In Sweden in the 
1990’s the participation rate in the self-employment program increased from virtually none to 
almost same as in the employment subsidy program. The advancement of the self-
employment program is likely to be a result of (i) a change in the labor market program 
policy, and (ii) an increase in the supply of skilled unemployed workers. The justification for 
the policy change is unclear, however. The literature indicate that a rather specific group of 
unemployed workers may benefit from self-employment programs; Neither are there any 
strong reasons to believe in general that self-employment should be preferable to 
conventional employment through subsidies. We examine, ex post, the justification for the 
policy change by comparing the post-program duration of employment for the two programs. 
In addition, we focus in some detail on the outcome for female workers and workers of 
foreign citizenship. The reason for this is the explicit policy to direct those workers to self-
employment. The data we study are the inflow to the two programs from June 1995 to 
December 1996. The program participants are followed to March 1999. The data contain 
detailed spell and background information on 9,043 unemployed workers who participated in 
the self-employment program and 14,142 who participated in the employment subsidy 
program. The second explanation, see (ii), for the increase in self-employment program 
implies a potentially serious selection problem. We discuss how the selection process may 
bias the effect estimate in the non-linear duration model that we use. Simulations help us to 
determine the magnitude of the selection bias in our application. Moreover, we exploit the 
existing behavioral heterogeneity across labor market offices to reduce the selection bias. We 
find that the risk of re-unemployment is more than twice as high for the subsidized 
employment program compared with the self-employment program. The large positive effect 
is, however, limited to male and female workers of Swedish origin. We thus conclude that the 
policy change in general has been successful, though we note that directing immigrant 
workers to self-employment is unlikely to improve the situation for this group of unfortunate 
workers on the Swedish labor market. 
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Forslund, A., Johansson, P. and Lindqvist, L., (2004). Employment subsidies – A fast lane 
from unemployment to work? IFAU Working Paper 2004, n. 18, Uppsala 
(http://www.ifau.se/upload/pdf/se/2004/wp04-18.pdf) 
Abstract. The treatment effect of a Swedish employment subsidy is estimated using exact 
covariate-matching and instrumental variables methods. Our estimates suggest that the 
programme had a positive treatment effect for the participants. We also show how non-
parametric methods can be used to estimate the time profile of treatment effects as well as 
how to estimate the effect of entering the programme at different points in time in the 
unemployment spell. Our main results are derived using matching methods. However, as a 
sensitivity test, we apply instrumental variables difference-indifference methods. These 
estimates indicate that our matching results are robust. 
 
Frolich, M. and Lechner, M. (2004). Regional treatment intensity as an instrument for the 
evaluation of labour market policies. Discussion Paper n. 1095, Bonn, IZA 
(http://repec.iza.org/dp1095.pdf) 
Abstract: The effects of active labour market policies (ALMP) on individual employment 
chances and earnings are evaluated by nonparametric instrumental variables based on Swiss 
administrative data with detailed regional information. Using an exogenous variation in the 
participation probabilities across fairly autonomous regional units (cantons) generated by the 
federal government, we identify the effects of ALMP by comparing individuals living in the 
same local labour market but in different cantons. Taking account of small sample problems 
occurring in IV estimation, our results suggest that ALMP increases individual employment 
probabilities by about 15% in the short term for a weighted subpopulation of compliers. 
 
Stenberg, A., (2005). Comprehensive Education for the Unemployed — Evaluating the 
Effects on Unemployment of the Adult Education Initiative in Sweden. Labour, vol. 19 (1): 
123-146 
Abstract. This paper evaluates the effects on unemployment in Sweden of the Adult 
Education Initiative (AEI) which during its run from 1997 to 2002 offered adult education 
to the unemployed at compulsory or upper secondary level. The AEI is compared with the 
vocational part of Labor Market Training (LMT) using unemployment incidence and 
unemployment duration as outcome variables, both measured immediately after completion 
of the programs. For unemployment incidence, selection on unobservables is taken into 
account by using a bivariate probit model. The analysis of unemployment duration considers 
both selection bias and censored observations. The results indicate lower incidence following 
participation in the AEI, but also — significant at the 10 per cent level — longer duration. 
 
Winter-Ebmer, R., (2006). Coping with a structural crisis: Evaluating an innovative 
redundancy-retraining project. International Journal of Manpower, vol. 27 (8): 700-721 
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Abstract. The purpose of this article is to evaluate a specific manpower training program in 
Austria; a program which was particularly designed for workers affected by a structural crisis 
in the steel industry. Microeconometric evaluation methods were used to assess earnings and 
employment probabilities up to five years after training. A treatment/control group approach 
was used together with instrumental variables estimates to control for selective entry into 
training. The results show considerable wage gains – even for a period of five years after 
leaving the Foundation – as well as improved employment prospects. The research has 
concentrated on a very specific project, which was exceptional in terms of broad training and 
counseling as well as in terms of funding and selection of trainees; therefore, it is not easily 
generalisable to other programs. The success of the program can be traced back to high 
incentives of all participants which, in turn, was caused by joint financing by local 
government, the workers themselves and the firm which made these workers redundant in the 
first place. Moreover, a combination of job counseling, search activities and training in 
capabilities which give presentable certificates turned out to be successful. The study will be 
valuable to those who look at specifics of job training programs as well as to those who are 
interested in designing programs for structural change. 
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8.3 Synthesis: main hypotheses, data requirements, pros and cons 
 
Instrumental Variables (IV) 
Main hypotheses Data requirements Pros Cons 
The instrumental variable Z 
must satisfy two conditions: 
- Z affects the selection into 
treatment. 
- Z is not related with the 
unobserved variables and is 
not directly related with the 
outcome of interest. 
Cross-sectional data, longitudinal 
or repeated cross-sectional data. 
Deals directly with selection 
based on unobservables, either 
time invariant or not. 
Very difficult to find an 
instrumental variable 
satisfying the two crucial 
assumptions. 
 
  If a proper instrument is found, 
it guarantees that the estimated 
effect is causal. 
In case of heterogeneous 
treatment effects, the IV 
method does not estimate 
ATT, but a local average 
treatment effect (LATE). 
   The instrument may have 
insufficient variation in the 
selection into treatment  
weak instrument. 
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9. Conclusions 
This report presents the main methods used to evaluate the impacts of public policies using 
counterfactual methods. Our aim was not to discuss all the econometric details of these 
approaches – for which there are specialised books and papers – but rather to promote the 
culture of the evaluation of public policies within the European Commission showing the 
relevance and utility of the counterfactual framework. In order to put this framework into 
context, we have exemplified its applicability to Active Labour Market Policies. Yet it has to 
be highlighted that these tools are very flexible and can be used to evaluate the effect of a 
wide spectrum of public policies. For instance, a simple literature review conducted on 
Scopus using the search words “policy evaluation” and limiting the search to “Articles” or 
“Reviews” finds 2343 documents published between the 1974 and the 2013 in the area 
“Economics, Econometrics and Finance” (Figure 8). Limiting the search to the period 
between 2005 and 2013 we obtain 831 documents, most of them in heterogeneous fields like 
employment, education, health, development and environmental policies13. 
 
 
 
 
 
Finally, it is worth stressing that the distinction between ex-post and ex-ante policy 
evaluation, as exists for instance in the European Commission, where different working 
groups are concerned with ex-ante (impact assessment) and ex-post (evaluation) analyses, 
should not be generalised to the methods applicable to these analyses.     
The methods presented in this report are ex-post evaluation approaches because they evaluate 
the effects of a policy after its implementation. But, as discussed by Martini and Trivellato 
(2011), to be effective, any evaluation has to be designed before the implementation of the 
                                                          
13
 This literature review has been concluded in August 2012 
Figure 8 – Number of Articles or Reviews in the subject area 
“Economics, Econometrics and Finance” containing the words “policy 
evaluation” in their “Title, Abstract or Keywords” by year 
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policy to assess, i.e. ex-ante. Furthermore, the results of ex-post policy evaluations on a 
specific field are typically the inputs of studies aiming at assessing the impact of future 
policies on the same field. Last but not least, the application of the counterfactual approach to 
a unit of analysis, for example a territorial unit such as a region, can be used to justify the 
extension of the same policy, e.g. under logic of intervention, to similar units or set of units. 
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Abstract 
 
This report describes the policy evaluation framework and the different counterfactual analysis evaluation strategies: propensity 
score matching, regression discontinuity design, differences-in-differences and instrumental variables. For each method we 
present the main assumptions it relies on and the data requirements. These methodologies apply to any type of policy and, in 
general, to any type of intervention. A selection of papers applying this approach in the context of labour market interventions is 
also included. 
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EU policies with independent, evidence-based scientific and technical support throughout the 
whole policy cycle.  
 
Working in close cooperation with policy Directorates-General, the JRC addresses key societal 
challenges while stimulating innovation through developing new standards, methods and tools, 
and sharing and transferring its know-how to the Member States and international community. 
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and food security; health and consumer protection; information society and digital agenda; 
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